Seowoo Chung

Welcome! I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, specializing in international political economy and international institutions. My research examines how governments and firms navigate institutional constraints in global economic governance, particularly in trade, investment, and climate. Some topics I explore are the relationship between WTO escalation and foreign lobbying, oil and gas firms' utilization of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), and authoritarian censorship of trade disputes.

You can view my CV (updated March 2025) here.

Working Papers

Strategic Censorship? Public Opinion, Authoritarian Politics, and the International Trade Regime [abstract] [paper]

International organizations promote cooperation by diffusing information among states and the public. But how does this information reach the public under authoritarian regimes? I examine how an authoritarian government with a censorship apparatus can use government-controlled media to offset international organizations’ information effects. The authoritarian government selectively censors IO news based on the likelihood of success in invoking a defensive reaction, highlighting provocative complaints by hostile states while reducing those by others that may lead to suspicions about government behavior. I find support for my arguments through analysis of an original dataset of Chinese newspaper articles by 117 newspapers on all WTO disputes involving China. I further conduct a survey experiment on Chinese adults, finding that exposure to information about China being sued in a WTO dispute significantly reduces support for international institutions and free trade, especially for those disputes against the United States.

Global Governance Unbound? Expansion Dynamics in the IMF (with Allison Carnegie and Richard Clark) [abstract] [paper]

While some scholars argue that bureaucratic IOs tend to outgrow their mandates, others claim that IOs curtail their activities under pressure. We introduce a new measure of scope expansion in IOs to adjudicate this debate. We argue that IOs broaden their remits during stable periods, incorporating salient issues to maintain relevance and competitiveness. However, during crises, they retrench and refocus on core priorities. To test this argument, we analyze novel text data from IMF working papers, tracking the breadth of topics covered by Fund researchers over time. We then assess whether shifts in IMF funding align with these trends. Our findings show that the IMF moder- ately expanded its purview in the 21st century, incorporating gender issues and climate change into its work, but significantly narrowed its focus during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. These results carry important implications for claims of IO overreach and offer insights regarding the legitimacy and adaptability of global governance.

In the Shadow of Crisis: Lobbying and Trade Strategy Beyond the WTO [abstract]

How do firms respond to unfair foreign trade measures? This paper examines the relationship between the two distinct routes of influencing foreign trade policy—WTO escalation and bilateral engagement—by utilizing an external shock in the WTO system: the WTO Appellate Body crisis. I argue that given resource constraints, firms strategize in their decisions between prioritizing direct lobbying of the foreign government or channeling their influence through their home government for bilateral negotiations or multilateral litigation. In the face of external shocks that reduce the likelihood of success through one pathway, firms are likely to shift their efforts to alternative avenues of influence. The implication is that the weakening of multilateral institutions increases foreign lobbying in response to trade barriers. I test this argument using original data on U.S. tariffs as well as foreign lobbying and diplomatic activities within the U.S. between 1999 and 2020.

Research in Progress

Political Barriers to the Energy Transition: Climate Risk, Investment Protection, and Firm Behavior

Too Many Ties to Bind? Regime Complex and the Costs of Defection