Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
Columbia University
Welcome! I am a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University, specializing in international political economy and international institutions. My research studies the politics of global governance under strain, focusing on how governments, firms, and IOs navigate the erosion of multilateral rules, enforcement, and legitimacy.
My work has appeared in International Studies Quarterly, and my research is supported by the Columbia Center for Political Economy and the APSA-NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (DDRIG). I hold a B.A. and M.A. in Political Science from Korea University, Seoul.
You can view my CV (updated August 2026) here.
International organizations promote cooperation by diffusing information among states and the public. But how does this information reach the public under authoritarian regimes? I examine how an authoritarian government with a censorship apparatus can use government-controlled media to offset international organizations’ information effects. The authoritarian government selectively censors IO news based on the likelihood of success in invoking a defensive reaction, suppressing complaints made by neutral counterparts that may lead to concerns for noncompliance while allowing limited attention toward provocative complaints by hostile states. I find support for my arguments through analysis of an original dataset of Chinese newspaper articles by 116 newspapers on all WTO disputes involving China. Survey experiment on Chinese citizens tests the microfoundations of the information strategy, finding that exposure to information about China being sued in a WTO dispute significantly reduces support for international law, especially for those disputes against the United States.
How do firms adapt to the decline of multilateralism? I argue that the delegalization of international institutions increases the returns to domestic political lobbying for firms exposed to foreign trade barriers. Focusing on WTO adjudication, I argue that as this system becomes less reliable, the trajectory of contested trade barriers becomes less institutionally anchored and their administration less constrained by external review. These changes make lobbying a more valuable means of managing political risk and seeking firm-specific relief. I test this argument using the WTO Appellate Body crisis and a novel firm-level measure of exposure to U.S. antidumping and countervailing duties, constructed from 3.9 million bill-of-lading records and the timing of U.S. trade-remedy actions. Panel event-study estimates show that the effect of trade-remedy exposure on lobbying rises sharply in late 2017 and persists across the Trump and Biden administrations, indicating a durable shift in firm strategy. The response is concentrated among firms from active WTO litigants and those importing products previously contested at the WTO, for whom the loss of adjudication was most consequential. My findings show that the erosion of multilateral institutions does not eliminate foreign influence over trade policy, but rather redirects it toward the more opaque arena of domestic lobbying.
While some scholars argue that bureaucratic IOs tend to outgrow their mandates, others claim that IOs curtail their activities under pressure. We introduce a new measure of scope expansion in IOs to adjudicate this debate. We argue that IOs broaden their remits during stable periods, incorporating salient issues to maintain relevance and competitiveness. However, during crises, they retrench and refocus on core priorities. To test this argument, we analyze novel text data from IMF working papers, tracking the breadth of topics covered by Fund researchers over time. We then assess whether shifts in IMF funding align with these trends. Our findings show that the IMF moderately expanded its purview in the 21st century, incorporating gender issues and climate change into its work, but significantly narrowed its focus during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. These results carry important implications for claims of IO overreach and offer insights regarding the legitimacy and adaptability of global governance.
International organizations (IOs) need legitimacy to perform their mandates, but they also compete for public attention in an increasingly crowded information environment. This paper argues that artificial intelligence creates an attention--legitimacy tradeoff for global governance. On the one hand, AI can make IOs appear innovative, modern, and capable of addressing complex problems, thereby increasing public engagement. On the other hand, AI can undermine legitimacy because many people associate it with opacity, elite control, and weak accountability. We evaluate this argument using an original survey experiment and novel social media data. In the experiment, respondents are less supportive of IOs when those organizations emphasize their use of AI. In the observational analysis of IO Twitter posts from 2012 to 2022, however, tweets referencing AI generate greater engagement than otherwise similar posts. Our findings show that AI can increase the visibility of international organizations while eroding trust in them, creating a key tension as IOs seek to navigate the evolving global governance landscape.